The title of this post is the title of this notable new essay authored by Alex Piquero just published by Criminology & Public Policy. Here is part of the essay's introduction (with cites removed):
Since the onset of the novel coronavirus, criminologists have researched how the virus and its policy responses have affected crime and criminal justice, with the most significant findings indicating: (1) a steady increase in specific forms of violence, including primarily homicides/community gun violence and domestic violence; (2) reductions or stability in virtually all property crimes, but the acceleration of certain types of offending, such as fraud and cybercrime, due in large part to increased reliance on the internet and related platforms; (3) the emergence of new crime types, such as public health violations for breaking COVID-19 safety protocols; (4) a reduction in prison and jail populations — especially in the first 6–9 months of the pandemic; (5) a rapid spread of viral infections in jails and prisons; (6) a substantial increase in opioid use and fatalities; (6) the creation of gaps in the delivery of needed medical and mental health screening and treatment; and (7) an initial reduction in police stops, citations, and arrests — particularly in the first few months of the pandemic as many departments pulled back on patrol and limited contact with the public in large part due to viral spread, lockdowns — leading to fewer persons out in public, and a lack of protective equipment.
These research efforts have been important in documenting changes in crime and the criminal justice response and have provided important baseline information to compare against as criminologists continue to track changes in crime in the COVID-19 era. Yet, one of the glaring omissions from the research accumulated thus far — and not necessarily the fault of criminologists per se — has been the lack of policy-relevant discussion surrounding the effects of all-things-COVID on the criminal justice system. This essay takes a step in that direction.
In the sections that follow, I highlight what was the nonexistent policy playbook and initial response by the various actors of the criminal justice system and the subsequent policy decisions and lessons learned as the system navigated the viral outbreak in real time with little — or constantly changing guidance — from state and federal officials. Not only were communities ravaged by the virus — and the racial/ethnic health injustices brought to light, but so to were police, court, and correctional systems and personnel as many became infected, hospitalized, and died — all the while the wheels of the justice system continued at a slower pace (with respect to policing) and in some cases stalled or stopped altogether for a period of time (such as the court system). Following this section, I turn to some of the early experiences as to how policing, courts, and corrections made decisions to adapt to the spread of the virus. The essay closes with some lessons learned by criminal justice agencies, some policy considerations, and importantly how the COVID-19 pandemic in concert with calls for social and racial justice within the justice (and health) system(s) have hopefully moved the dial to reform and reimagine what criminal justice could look like and should like with respect to trust, legitimacy, accountability, and transparency.
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