Over at SCOTUSblog, John Elwood continues his yeoman's work via his "Relist Watch" postings which highlight cases that the Supreme Court considered but did not resolve during recent certiorari review conferences. In this week's installment of "Relist Watch," we get started with a review of the news, blogged here, that cert was (somewhat surprisingly) denied on oft-relisted vagueness challenges to pre-Booker mandatory application of career-offender guideline. But thereafter we get the details on some interesting new additions to the relist watch that should intrigue criminal justice fans (with links from the original):
The court also denied review without comment in a knot of cases involving whether sentence enhancements imposed under the residual clause of the then-mandatory sentencing guidelines’ career offender provision were constitutionally infirm because the clause is similar to an Armed Career Criminal Act provision declared unconstitutionally vague in Johnson v. United States. So long Allen v. United States, 17-5684; farewell Gates v. United States, 17-6262; auf Wiedersehen, James v. United States, 17-6769; adieu, Robinson v. United States, 17-6877; smell ya later Lester v. United States, 17-1366. It’s curious when cases that have been relisted as many as ten times are denied review without even a short statement respecting denial. But perhaps, just as the most effective dissent from denial of cert is never seen (because the court just decides to go ahead and grant review), maybe someone wrote a killer concurrence. If this strikes you as maddeningly indeterminate, don’t worry: We’ll all know what happened in about another 70 years when the current justices’ papers are released....
Clark v. Louisiana, 16-9541, is a capital case involving a prisoner convicted of murder in connection with the death of a correctional officer during an attempt to escape from the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola. The case raises four issues, but it’s safe to assume one is the particular focus of the Supreme Court. Issue number one turns on the fact that Louisiana law requires jurors to “find beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists,” but does not require the jury to employ that same beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies to making a second determination, whether “the sentence of death should be imposed.” The second issue is whether the “evolving standards of decency” standard forbids using the death penalty when jurors could not be sure which of several defendants inflicted the blows that caused the victim’s death. The third issue involves whether Clark was presumptively prejudiced when a deputy monitoring the trial, within view of other jurors, asked an alternate juror how she thought the trial was going. The fourth issue may explain why the case has been hanging around the docket since last October, and only recently was released and relisted: Clark alleges that his lawyer conceded his guilt in the aggravated escape during his first trial and only contested whether the death penalty should be imposed. Clark says he represented himself at his second trial, where he was convicted, solely to prevent his counsel from conceding his guilt against his wishes. Because the court held on May 14 that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to insist that his counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsel’s view is that confessing guilt offers the best chance to avoid the death penalty, I expect they’ll be taking a very close look at this case.
The last four new relists consist of two sets of related criminal cases arising out of states whose names begin with the letter O. And all four involve the court’s repeated use of the murky procedure of “rescheduling” cases — ordinarily meaning the court moved them from one conference to another before considering them at conference. Wood v. Oklahoma, 17-6891, and Jones v. Oklahoma, 17-6943, have been rescheduled nine times each — and both have been rescheduled even since they were relisted. Lee v. Ohio, 17-7213, and Belton v. Ohio, 17-7233, have both been rescheduled four times. So perhaps these cases will at last shed some light on the rescheduling procedure.
The first two cases are from a place where, if my sources are to be believed, the wind comes sweepin’ down the plain, where there is plenty of air and plenty of room. In the years around Y2K, Tremane Wood and Julius Jones, two African-Americans, were convicted in central Oklahoma of unrelated murders of white men and sentenced to death. In 2017, after Jones had finished state and federal collateral proceedings, and as Moore would soon complete them, a statistical study on capital-sentencing patterns in Oklahoma was published, concluding that nonwhites accused of killing white males are statistically more likely to receive a death sentence, even controlling for aggravating circumstances. Under Oklahoma’s post-conviction statute, a death-sentenced prisoner has just 60 days to file a second or successive post-conviction application based on newly available evidence. Both filed post-conviction applications arguing that the study constituted newly discovered evidence that they were convicted and sentenced in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, the Eighth Amendment bar on cruel and unusual punishment, and the 14th Amendment right to due process of law. But the court denied their applications on the basis of a state procedural bar, saying that neither had shown that “the identified patterns of race and gender disparity were not ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence” at the time of their original post-conviction proceedings. The petitions in Wood v. Oklahoma, 17-6891, and Jones v. Oklahoma, 17-6943, present two main questions: First, whether the study indicating a risk that racial considerations entered into Oklahoma’s capital sentencing determinations proves that their death sentences are unconstitutional under the Sixth, Eighth, and 14th amendments; and second, whether Oklahoma’s post-conviction statute, as applied by the Oklahoma courts, denied Wood and Jones an adequate corrective process for the hearing and determination of their federal constitutional claims in violation of their rights under the 14th Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses.
To avoid further depressing our reader, we will refrain from quoting songs about our second O-state– at least beyond the upbeat kind that just spell its name. Ohio’s legislature has enacted a statute that requires that minors be tried as adults when the defendant is a 16-year-old (or a 14- or 15-year-old recidivist) who is charged with homicide or a handful of other serious offenses (kidnapping, rape, and the aggravated forms of arson, robbery and burglary), generally either while using a firearm or as a recidivist. In 2016, the Supreme Court of Ohio invalidated the statute as unconstitutional. After two justices retired, Ohio successfully sought rehearing, and less than a year later issued a decision upholding the mandatory transfer law as constitutional. To make things more confusing, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion reversing course, while Justice O’Connor (actually, Chief Justice O’Connor) wrote the dissent — just not the ones you think. The petitioners in Lee v. Ohio, 17-7213, and Belton v. Ohio, 17-7233, both were convicted of killing people in botched robberies. Both argue that mandatory trial as an adult violates the Constitution, relying on recent Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the lesser culpability of juvenile offenders and their greater potential for rehabilitation.
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