Split Second Circuit panel finds 17-year (way-below-guideline) prison sentence in terrorism case substantively unreasonable
On Friday, the Second Circuit released a notable sentencing opinion in US v. Mumuni, No. 18‐1604 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 2019) (available here). The start of the panel's majority opinion provides a basic overview of the key issue in the appeal:
In this terrorism case, the Government appeals the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed on Defendant‐Appellee Fareed Mumuni (“Mumuni”). He was convicted of, inter alia, conspiring to provide material support to the Islamic State of Iraq and al‐Sham (“ISIS”) and attempting to murder a federal agent in the name of ISIS. His advisory sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) was 85 years’ imprisonment. The sole question on appeal is whether the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Margo K. Brodie, Judge) erred — or “abused its discretion” — by imposing a 17‐ year sentence, which constitutes an 80% downward variance from the advisory Guidelines range. We conclude that it did. Accordingly, we REMAND the cause for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
Just over 30 pages later, the majority provides this summary of its rulings:
(1) Mumuni’s sentence of 17 years’ imprisonment — which constitutes an 80% reduction from his recommended Guidelines range of 85 years — is substantively unreasonable in light of his exceptionally serious conduct involving a domestic terrorist attack against law enforcement in the name of ISIS.
(2) Where a district court has accepted a defendant’s guilty plea and his allocution to the elements of each charged offense, it cannot make findings of fact during sentencing that contradict or otherwise minimize the conduct described at the defendant’s plea hearing.
(3) Where a sentencing court opts to compare the relative culpability of co‐defendants, it cannot selectively rely on a factor when it serves a mitigating function in one case, but then subsequently ignore the same factor when it serves an aggravating function in the other case.
(4) A defendant’s legally‐required compliance with institutional regulations during his term of pre‐trial and pre‐ sentencing detention is not a substantially mitigating factor for purposes of sentencing.
(5) At Mumuni’s resentencing, the District Court, on the basis of the record that supported Mumuni’s guilty plea, shall accord substantially greater weight to the following 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors: (a) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (b) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (c) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; and (d) the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.
Judge Hall partially dissents, explaining that he thinks that the sentencing court needs to better explain its chosen sentence but making this point at the start of his opinion:
“We set aside a district courtʹs sentence as substantively unreasonable only if affirming it would damage the administration of justice because the sentence imposed was shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.” United States v. Douglas, 713 F.3d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and ellipsis omitted) (emphasis added). As an initial matter, I do not believe the seventeen‐year sentence is shockingly low and, therefore, I must dissent in part.
Comments
Post a Comment